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Introduction
The challenged factual findings of the district court should not be accepted by
this Court, whether the clear error or free review standard is applied, as they are
clearly contradicted by the officers’ bodycam footage. The opening brief adequately
presented the challenge to the factual findings in its argument, thereby permitting
the Court’s review. Furthermore, Mr. Maahs did not violate the principle behind
I.A.R. 35 because the State actually addressed in the Respondent’s brief the issue
whether the district court’s factual findings constituted clear error.
The State has failed to demonstrate that the intrusive measures used by the
police to seize and restrain Mr. Maahs were justified as a necessary and reasonable
part of an investigative detention.

The State ignores the officers’ uncontested

testimony that at the time they employed these intrusive measures to apprehend Mr.
Maahs, they had no information or evidence establishing that he and Korona were
armed and dangerous. Given the absence of such evidence, their forceful measures
transformed the encounter into a de facto arrest, for which the State does not even
attempt to argue probable cause existed.
Even if the district court’s factual findings are completely accepted by this
Court, they did not provide the officers with sufficient reasonable suspicion to support
even an investigative detention. Without any supporting authority, the State adopts
the district court’s contravention of Terry v. Ohio by endorsing the subjective hunches
of the credit union tellers as a validly weighed factor that supports a finding of
reasonable suspicion.
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A.

The Opening Brief’s Challenge to the Trial Court’s Factual
Findings was Sufficient to Permit Review for Clear Error

The State argues that given the limited circumstances involved in State v.
Andersen, 164 Idaho 309, 429 P.3d 850 (2018), the proper standard of review for the
trial court’s factual findings is clear error. (Respondent’s brief, p. 10). The State
further argues that Mr. Maahs’s incorrect application of the free review standard
should result in this Court’s refusal to review the factual findings at all. Id.
However, the challenge to the trial court’s factual findings presented in the
opening brief is sufficient to warrant this Court’s review, regardless of whether the
applicable standard is clear error, rather than free review. I.A.R. 35(a)(4) provides
that an appellant’s “statement of issues presented will be deemed to include every
subsidiary issue fairly comprised therein.”

Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners

Association, 152 Idaho 519, 525, 272 P.3d 491, 498 (2012). The opening brief’s
assertion in the statement of issues that the appropriate standard is free review
necessarily implicates the subsidiary issue of whether the district court’s factual
findings should be accepted by this Court.
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that the requirements
of I.A.R. 35(a)(4) “’might be relaxed where the issue[s are] ... addressed by authorities
cited or arguments contained in the briefs.’” State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 422,
224 P.3d 485, 489 (2009) (quoting State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959, 961, 783 P.2d
298, 300 (1989)), overruled on other grounds, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842
P.2d 660 (1992). In Everhart v. Washington County Rd. & Bridge Dept, 130 Idaho
273, 274-75, 939 P.2d 849, 850-51 (1997), the Court applied this relaxed standard.
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Despite Everhart’s failure to designate any issues on appeal, because she and the
respondents between them provided argument and authority regarding them, the
Court did not rigidly apply I.A.R. 35 but rather considered the entirety of the appeal.
Id. at 275, 939 P.2d at 851. The Court reasoned that “[b]oth parties discussed the
factual background in sufficient detail [such] that we can decide the issues ….” Id.
Although the opening brief asserted that the applicable standard should be
free review, Mr. Maahs presented sufficient factual background and authority to
permit this Court to review his challenge to the specified factual findings, even under
the clear error standard.

The opening brief expressly recognized the standard

typically applied in an appeal of the decision on a motion to suppress, under which
the Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial
evidence. (Appellant’s brief, p. 22). Additionally, the opening brief contained a
detailed summary of the bodycam footage and a section in the argument titled, “The
District Court’s Factual Findings and Conclusions are Inconsistent With the Officers’
Bodycam Footage.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-13, 16-18, 23).
By arguing that the officers’ bodycam recordings contradict the district court’s
findings, Mr. Maahs effectively asserted that the findings constitute clear error,
unsupported by substantial evidence. The recordings are the objective and neutral
depiction of the officers’ apprehension of Mr. Maahs in real-time. That authentic
video evidence was admitted by the State during the June 3, 2019 suppression
hearing, after both officers confirmed that they had reviewed it. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 103,
L. 10—p. 104, L. 6 (State’s Exhibit 1 (Reimers)), p. 156, Ls. 5-10, p. 162, Ls. 10-20
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(State’s Exhibit 2 (Mathis)). Both officers also affirmed the accuracy of the clips from
their full bodycam recordings admitted by the defense. (6/3/19 Tr, p. 119, L. 14—p.
121, L. 2 (Defense Exhibit C (Reimers)), p. 172, L. 3—p. 173, L. 21 (Defense Exhibit
D (Mathis)).
Where a video recording clearly contradicts a trial court’s factual finding, the
finding is not supported by substantial evidence. In State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho
681, 684, 52 P.3d 325, 328 (Ct. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals determined that
because an audio recording did not disprove a police officer’s testimony, the Court
could not conclude that the district court’s factual findings were unsupported by
substantial evidence.
That being so, where a recording does clearly disprove a district court’s factual
finding, the finding is necessarily unsupported by substantial evidence and thus
constitutes clear error. Various courts have reached such a conclusion. See e.g.,
Wiggins v. Florida Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 42 Fla.L.Weekly S
85, 209 So.3d 1165, 1175 (2017); City of Missoula v. Metz, 2019 MT 264, 451 P.3d
530, 539 (2019); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); State
v. Andrade, 342 Ga.App. 228, 230, 803 S.E.2d 118, 121 (2017). Also, although Mr.
Maahs acknowledges that under Rule 15(f) of the Internal Rules of the Idaho
Supreme Court unpublished opinions do not constitute binding authority, two such
opinions of the Court of Appeals serve as examples where clear error was found based
where video evidence contradicted a trial court’s factual findings: State v. Gouge, No.
45403 (Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2018); State v. Riley, No. 47372 (Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2021).
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Finally, this Court should review the district court’s factual findings because
Mr. Maahs has not violated the principle behind I.A.R. 35. In Suitts v. Nix, 114 Idaho
706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005), the Court explained it will not consider issues not
addressed in the opening brief because “the issues presented ... are the arguments
and authority to which the respondent has an opportunity to respond ….” In State v.
Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 422, 224 P.3d 485, 489 (2009), the Court considered an issue
that Watkins had failed to designate as an issue or argue in his opening brief because
the State had an opportunity to respond.
Here, the State actually addressed the issue of whether the challenged factual
findings were supported by substantial evidence. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 11-13).
Accordingly, this Court should not decline to review the trial court’s factual findings,
even if it does so for clear error.
B.

The District Court’s Factual Findings are Clearly Erroneous
Because They are Contradicted by the Officers’ Bodycam
Footage

1.

Mr. Maahs’s Backpedaling did not Occur After He Looked
at the Rear Hallway Door

The State maintains that the officers’ bodycam footage supports the district
court’s finding that Mr. Maahs ignored the officers’ commands and looked as if he
intended to flee: “The on-body video footage clearly shows that after Maahs was told
to come towards the officers after he exited the bathroom, but that [sic] he looked
towards the door behind him and backed away from the officers instead.” 1
The State cites in its brief to 00:24-00:33 of State’s Exhibit 2, Officer Mathis’s
bodycam footage, as support for its position that instead of obeying the officers’
instructions to come to them, Mr. Maahs looked towards the door behind him and
1
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(Respondent’s brief, p. 10-11). The State also characterizes the officers’ testimony at
the suppression hearing as consistent with their bodycam footage: “Corporal Reimers
again testified that the officers directed Maahs to come towards them, but instead he
‘turned his body towards that door in the hallway and appeared to be looking at that
door, possibly as an escape route.’” (8/27/18 Tr., p.101, L.2 – p.103, L.9, p.126, Ls.1825, p.139, L.21 – p.140, L.3). Officer Mathis also testified during the suppression
hearing that Maahs ‘glanced over’ and ‘started going away from [the officers] towards
another door’ after he exited the bathroom. (8/27/18 Tr., p.158, L.10 – p.159, L.8,
p.166, L.23 – p.167, L.11.)” (Respondent’s brief, p. 11-12).
In its Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress, (R., pp. 226-242), the district
court repeats such findings, which support its conclusion that Mr. Maahs ignored the
officers and attempted to flee. The district court finds that “[b]oth officers told [Mr.
Maahs] to come over to them,” but then “Maahs looked behind him at a door at the
rear of the hallway and began backing towards it.” (R., p. 227). The district court
further observes that “[b]oth officers were concerned when Maahs looked down the
hallway and then backed away from Officer Mathis when he was telling Maahs to
come forward.” (R., pp. 228-229). The district court also similarly finds that Mr.
Maahs, “in response to being instructed to come towards [the officers], looked behind
him at a door at the end of the hallway and began backing towards it ….” (R., p. 233)
(emphasis added).
backed away from them. (Respondent’s brief, p. 11). However, as reflected in
State’s Exhibit 2, Officer Mathis’s bodycam is initially oriented downwards during
his advance on Mr. Maahs. As a result, it does not show Mr. Maahs “look[ing]
towards the door” and then backing towards it. Id.
-6-

The State’s summary of Corporal Reimer’s bodycam footage is wrong, for the
video clearly contradicts the district court’s findings and the officers’ testimony, thus
they are unsupported by substantial evidence. Corporal Reimers’s bodycam footage
disproves the finding that Mr. Maahs responded to the officers’ orders by initially
looking behind at the hallway door, then beginning to back towards it. (Respondent’s
brief, p. 11; R., p. 233). In fact, his bodycam footage unmistakably shows that Mr.
Maahs begins backpedaling not after first looking at the hallway door, but when
Officer Mathis immediately begins advancing on him. (State’s Exhibit 1, 3:18-3:19).
Furthermore, Corporal Reimers’s bodycam clearly depicts Mr. Maahs briefly glancing
backwards over his left shoulder at 3:20, after he has already begun backpedaling
from Officer Mathis, who is aggressively marching towards him. (State’s Exhibit 1,
3:18-3:20). The incontrovertible reality reflected in Officer this bodycam footage is
that Mr. Maahs backpedals in reaction to Officer Mathis’s rapid approach, not after
looking at the hallway door. (State’s Exhibit 1, 3:18; R., 183-85 (screen shots from
Officer Reimers’s bodycam, admitted at the suppression hearing as Exhibits E, F, G)).
This is not simply a competing interpretation of the bodycam footage, nor is
the Court being asked to usurp the district court’s role by weighing conflicting
evidence; Corporal Reimers’s bodycam footage, State’s Exhibit 1, is an objective
memorialization of Mr. Maahs’s seizure that refutes the district court’s findings,
regardless of whether the video evidence is viewed frame-by-frame or full speed.
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Green, 149 Idaho 706, 708, 239 P.3d
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811, 813 (Ct. App. 2010) (internal quotations removed). Because this video evidence
clearly contradicts the district court’s findings regarding the sequence of events
following Mr. Maahs’s exit from the bathroom, they are not supported by substantial
evidence and are clearly erroneous.
These clearly erroneous findings form the basis for the conclusion that Mr.
Maahs’s backpedaling reflects a conscious attempt to evade the officers. (R., p. 233).
The State relies on this alleged evasion of the officers by Mr. Maahs to support its
position that the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and were
justified in using the most extreme and intrusive methods to apprehend Mr. Maahs
during an investigatory detention. (Respondent’s brief, p. 19, 22, 25).
2.

The District Court Clearly Erred by Finding
That Officer Mathis Only Frisked Mr. Maahs

Officer Mathis’s bodycam, State’s Exhibit 2, as well as his testimony, clearly
contradict the district court’s conclusion that Officer Mathis conducted a “quick frisk”
of Mr. Maahs. (R., p. 233). Review of his bodycam footage refutes the claim that
Officer Mathis merely patted Mr. Maahs’s outer clothing down, only then removing
those objects that felt like weapons. Rather, State’s Exhibit 2 at 1:18-1:39 shows
Officer Mathis putting his hands inside Mr. Maahs’s front and back pockets and
removing everything, including keys, lighters, and a law enforcement badge, putting
those objects on the adjacent water fountain. Officer Mathis even acknowledged on
cross-examination after being shown Defendant’s Exhibit D, the clip from his
bodycam video, that he put his hands inside Mr. Maahs’s pockets and then “emptied
all of the contents ….” (6/3/19 Tr., p. 172, Ls. 19-24) (emphasis added). He further
-8-

admitted that these actions were not consistent with a Terry investigative detention.
(6/3/19 Tr., p. 172, L. 19—p. 173, L. 3). 2 Officer Mathis never testified that he only
put his hands in Mr. Maahs’s pockets after externally patting something that felt like
a weapon. (6/3/19 Tr., pp. 169-173). While he testified that he removed the law
enforcement badge inside Mr. Maahs’s pocket because it was a “hard metal object,”
he did not describe it as a weapon or that he had been concerned it might be one when
he patted it through Mr. Maahs’s clothes; rather, he claimed it could be “anything.”
(6/3/19 Tr., p. 171, L. 15).
Although Officer Mathis stated in response to a question on cross-examination
that keys “could” be a weapon, he did not testify that he had removed Mr. Maahs’s
keys from his pocket because of any such concern. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 171, Ls. 17-18).
Additionally, Officer Mathis did not explain why he removed the lighters in the course
of emptying Mr. Maahs’s pockets while he was handcuffed. (State’s Exhibit 2, 1:181:39). He likewise did not testify that he removed Mr. Maahs’s ID card because of
concerns for officer safety. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 160, Ls. 11-14).
This bodycam evidence and testimony thus completely contradict the district
court’s characterization of Officer Mathis’s actions as a pat-down “frisk”; to the extent
the district court’s legal conclusion was based on its finding that Officer Mathis
merely patted down Mr. Maahs and did not put his hands inside his pockets, such a

The district court improperly sustained the State’s objection to Officer Mathis’s
admission that his actions were not consistent with an investigative detention.
(6/3/19 Tr., p. 173, Ls. 4-13). This admission was not an improper legal conclusion;
it confirmed that the officer had not merely patted down Mr. Maahs externally and
only gone into his pockets after feeling something resembling a weapon.

2
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finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. Notably, the district court’s order
does not even address this bodycam footage and testimony when characterizing
Officer Mathis’s actions as merely a “frisk.” (R., pp. 226-242).
C.

The Extreme Measures Used to Seize Mr. Maahs
Exceeded the Scope of an Investigatory Detention
and Escalated the Encounter to a De Facto Arrest

The factors identified by the State do not establish that Mr. Maahs and Mr.
Korona presented a danger to the safety of the officers or others that warranted the
implementation of these multiple restraints on Mr. Maahs’s liberty in the course of
an investigatory detention. Because the officers’ safety concerns were not based on
objective facts supporting the conclusion that the men were armed and dangerous,
the officers’ forceful tactics necessarily exceeded the scope of a permissible
investigatory detention and rose to the level of a de facto arrest.
The State’s argument that the officers’ tactics were justified by the dangerous
nature of this encounter completely overlooks both officers’ admissions that they had
no specific articulable facts or information, that Mr. Maahs and/or Mr. Korona were
armed or dangerous. While Corporal Reimers expressed concern that the men could
have gone into the bathroom in “preparation for an attack,” (6/3/19 Tr., p. 112, Ls. 24), the following illustrative exchange with him reveals the lack of any specific,
articulable facts to support his hunch:
Q.

Were you told anything – you said preparation for an attack.
Was there any information given to you by anybody at the
credit union that they thought these men were armed?

A.

No.
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Q.

Was there any evidence or – in fact, you weren’t told anything
indicating they had acted violently or aggressively?

A.

I agree.

Q.

And so you didn’t have any evidence they were armed
or dangerous at that point, did you, sir?

A.

No.

Q.

And you called on the radio for assistance after you went
in and were observing the door, correct?

A.

Right.

Q.

The door to the bathroom.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you used the phrase, “Both of these guys saw me and went
into the bathroom together, acting kind of hinky,” correct?

A.

I believe I did use that when talking to Officer Mathis, yes.

Q.

Actually, I think you used that on the radio when you radioed
for assistance.

A.

Okay. Sure.

…
Q.

So again you didn’t – but you didn’t mention anything about being
concerned about drug activity.

A.

On the radio?

Q.

Correct.

A.

No.

Q.

Or that you were worried that these men might be armed or
dangerous.

A.

No, I didn’t say that specifically.
-11-

Q.

You didn’t say that at all, did you, sir?

A.

No, I didn’t say that specifically.

Q.

All right. And, in fact, you didn’t say anything about
maybe that you were worried that they were preparing for
an attack.

A.

I did not say that, no.

…
Q.

Now, if you are concerned that somebody might be armed or
dangerous, you would certainly notify your fellow officers.
Isn't that true?

A.

Yeah. I did when I told Officer Mathis they're acting hinky.

Q.

Acting hinky?
That means armed and dangerous?

A.

It means something's afoot and you need to be careful. It means
it's not normal behavior. It means that things are not good to go
here. It means something is wrong.

Q.

My question was, are you saying when you said "hinky," you were
telling him that they might be armed and dangerous?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay. Because you probably are pretty clear if you think somebody
is armed and dangerous when you talk with other officers. Isn't that
correct?

A.

If I have, you know, some sort of reasonable knowledge or
some articulable facts that someone is armed and dangerous, I'm
going to let them know.

Q.

And you didn't say to Officer Mathis, “You know, I think they might
be preparing to attack,” like you did on direct examination,
correct?

A.

No, I didn't.
-12-

Q.

And again you said, “I don't know what we have exactly, but I
figured we'd detain them,” correct?

A.

Yes.

(6/3/19 Tr., p. 112, L. 5—p. 124, L. 10) (emphasis added); (State’s Exhibit 1, 2:12-3:15).
Corporal Reimers further testified that in the course of the encounter, neither Mr.
Maahs nor Mr. Korona reached for any weapon. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 138, Ls. 11-13). He
did not see Mr. Maahs physically resist Officer Mathis. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 138, Ls. 14-25).
Officer Mathis, like Corporal Reimers, speculated that the men might be inside
the bathroom “preparing weapons.” (6/3/19 Tr., p. 157, Ls. 15-16). However, he, too,
acknowledged that this concern was not based on any information he had indicating
the men were armed or dangerous. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 171, Ls. 23—p. 172, L. 2). During
the time Corporal Reimers briefs Officer Mathis, after Officer Mathis arrives inside
the credit union as backup, the two officers do not express any concern about being
vulnerable to a potential attack from the two men. (State’s Exhibit 2, 2:12-3:15).
Thus, the officers’ fears about this potential attack amount only to speculative
hunches, rather than an objectively grounded safety concern supported by specific
articulable facts. Such speculation cannot justify the use of extremely intrusive
measures as part of an investigative detention. In State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 878,
736 P.2d 1327, 1332 (1987), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that when objectively
evaluating an officer’s belief that a suspect may be armed and dangerous, “due weight
must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicions or 'hunch,' but to
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of
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his experience.” (citations omitted). The district court erred by weighing the officers’
gut instincts as the basis for the intrusive measures they used to seize Mr. Maahs,
notwithstanding their many years of experience.
1.

Mr. Maahs’s Alleged “Flight” Does Not Justify
the Officers’ Intrusive Measures

The State fails to identify facts regarding the officers’ seizure of Mr. Maahs
during this encounter that meet the “high threshold” required to justify the use of
handcuffs as part of an investigatory detention. See State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420,
421, 901 P.2d 1321, 1322 (1995). The State primarily justifies the use of handcuffs to
restrain Mr. Maahs based on his “apparent efforts to flee.” (Respondent’s brief, p.
191; R., p. 233). As set forth above, however, this conclusion was premised on the
clearly erroneous finding that Mr. Maahs, “in response to being instructed to come
towards [the officers], looked behind him at a door at the end of the hallway and began
backing towards it.” (R., p. 233). The officers’ distorted perception of this sequence
of events, which the district court clearly erred by accepting, is what “made them
think that the defendant was considering running out the door at the rear of the
hallway.” (R., p. 229).
Nevertheless, even if this Court somehow disagrees that the district court
clearly erred in its finding Mr. Maahs’s backpedaling reflected an intent to flee, the
Court must still examine the nature of this flight to ascertain whether it supports the
legal conclusion regarding whether the officers reasonably suspected criminal
activity or justified the officers’ measures as part of a valid investigative detention.
In Padilla v. State, 158 Idaho 184, 189-90, 345 P.3d 243, 248-89 (Ct. App. 2014), the
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court reviewed the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000) that “unprovoked flight,” while “not necessarily
indicative of wrongdoing … is certainly suggestive of such.” Padilla, 158 Idaho at
189, 345 P.3d at 248 (citing, Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added). The
Wardlow Court, however, declined to adopt a bright-line rule under which an
individual’s flight at the mere sight of a police officer automatically authorizes the
person’s detention. Padilla, 158 Idaho at 189, 345 P.3d at 248 (citing Wardlow, 528
U.S. at 126).
Padilla recognized that while a defendant may flee from police, this does not
necessarily provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. It cited a decision by
the Iowa Supreme Court, observing that “the circumstances surrounding the
suspect’s efforts to avoid the police must be such as to allow a rational conclusion that
flight indicated a consciousness of guilt.” Padilla, 158 Idaho at 189-90, 345 P.3d at
248-49 (quoting State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 643-44 (Iowa 2002)); see also, United
States v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that the Supreme Court
has never endorsed a per se rule that flight establishes reasonable suspicion and
treating it as just one factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis).
In this case, Mr. Maahs’s purported “efforts to flee” lasted a scant few seconds
followed by his complete submission to Officer Mathis’s command to get down on the
floor. (State’s Exhibit 1, 3:18-3:21). Mr. Maahs was compliant from that point
forward. (State’s Exhibit 2, 00:31-15:46). This flight occurred immediately after he
exited the bathroom, holding his cell phone to his ear. Id. Corporal Reimers described
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Mr. Maahs’s demeanor upon being confronted by the officers as “surprised” and
“shocked.” (6/3/19 Tr., p. 127, Ls. 2-10). Corporal Reimers even admitted this was
“odd,” given his initial suspicion that Mr. Maahs and Korona had gone down the
hallway into the bathroom because they had spotted him waiting at the credit union
doors. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 127, Ls. 2-6). He also acknowledged that if the two men had
wanted to evade him, they could have proceeded through the rear hallway door before
he entered the credit union. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 139, Ls. 1-20).
Corporal Reimers further agreed that Mr. Maahs never reached for the door
handle and never fully turned towards the door. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 141, Ls. 2-4; p. 142,
Ls. 4-9). This is confirmed by the bodycam footage. (State’s Exhibit 1, 3:18-3:22;
State’s Exhibit 2, 00:28-00:31). Considering the speed with which Officer Mathis
advanced and the fact that Mr. Maahs kept his phone to his ear while backpedaling,
Corporal Reimers conceded that Mr. Maahs might just have been “bewildered” and
“reflexively reacting to being shocked and surprised” by the sudden confrontation.
(6/3/19 Tr., p. 141, Ls. 2-9; p. 144, Ls. 9-15; p. 145, L. 8—p. 146, L. 23).
That Mr. Maahs’s “flight” does not reflect criminal culpability, but rather a
surprised instinctive reaction, is further supported by his exclamation, “Holy shit!”
as he crouches on the ground with Officer Mathis towering above, immediately
following the officer’s swift approach with his drawn and pointed firearm. (State’s
Exhibit 2, 00:38-00:39). Thus, even if the district court’s factual finding that Mr.
Maahs was trying to flee is upheld, at most there is substantial ambiguity that
precludes it from being given any significant weight in the reasonable suspicion
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analysis or to establish that Mr. Maahs presented a danger that justified the officers’
extreme restraints on his liberty.
2.

Officer Mathis Further Exceeded the Scope
of a Permissible Investigatory Detention by
Aiming His Gun at Mr. Maahs

Officer Mathis not only exceeded the bounds of a valid investigatory detention
by handcuffing Mr. Maahs, but by aiming his firearm directly at him. (State’s Exhibit
1, 3:20-3:24; State’s Exhibit 2, 00:30-00:34).

The State cannot demonstrate a

sufficient danger to justify this display of deadly force as a reasonable element of an
investigatory detention.
As an initial point, the State mischaracterizes Officer Mathis’s actions by
failing to even acknowledge that Officer Mathis pointed his gun at Mr. Maahs.
Instead, the State indicates throughout its brief only that Officer Mathis “drew” his
pistol. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 2, 3, 7, 15, 19). The district court likewise only
indicates in its opinion that Officer Mathis “drew” his gun. (R., pp. 227-28, 233). The
State supports its sanitized description with a cite to State’s Exhibit 2 at 00:26-00:45.
(Respondent’s brief, p. 2).
However, this minimization of Officer Mathis’s display of deadly force is flatly
contradicted by State’s Exhibits 1 and 2. In State’s Exhibit 1, at 3:20-3:23, Officer
Mathis can clearly be seen pointing his gun at Mr. Maahs, even after Mr. Maahs has
gotten down on the floor. State’s Exhibit 2 at 00:30-00:33 likewise indisputably shows
Officer Mathis not just drawing but pointing his pistol at Mr. Maahs. This is not just
a varying interpretation of this video evidence – no one reviewing the officers’ neutral
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and objective bodycam footage could conclude otherwise.

On top of this

incontrovertible video evidence, Corporal Reimers testified that Officer Mathis
pointed his gun at Mr. Maahs. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 133, Ls. 7-17, p. 135, Ls. 7-12).
In Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit
quoted the Seventh Circuit’s observation that a police officer’s aiming of a gun is “far
more frightening” than merely drawing it. Id. at 1188-89 (quoting United States v.
Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). The court opined
that such an aggressive measure can only be applied where the danger to the officer
is not just “potentially serious” but “clear and present.” Id.
The information known to Corporal Reimers and Officer Mathis at the time
they apprehended Mr. Maahs failed to establish such a “clear and present” danger
justifying Officer Mathis’s pointing of his firearm as a reasonable measure to protect
officer safety within the limited bounds of an investigatory detention. The State cites
State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 265-67, 47 P.3d 763, 768-70 (Ct. App. 2001) in its
efforts to fit Officer Mathis’s action within the narrow category of investigatory
detentions warranting such an extreme display of force. (Respondent’s brief, p. 18).
Notably, however, the State omits any description of the facts in Salato.
(Respondent’s brief, p. 18). There, law enforcement conducted a “high-risk traffic
stop” of a vehicle connected to the armed robberies of two convenience stores minutes
beforehand. Id. at 263, 47 P.3d 466. The robber displayed and cocked a semiautomatic pistol during the first robbery. In the second, he drew, cocked, and pointed
his gun at the clerk’s daughter. Id.
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The situation in Salato, where the police were presented with a highly
dangerous scenario based on known articulable facts, is worlds away from this case,
where, as previously noted, the officers candidly acknowledged they had no
information indicating Mr. Maahs or Mr. Korona were armed and dangerous. Aside
from this distinguishable case, the State cites no authority approving the aiming of
their firearms as part of an investigatory detention where, as Corporal Reimers and
Officer Mathis conceded, officers do not have objective facts establishing that a
suspect is armed and dangerous.
Despite Corporal Reimers’ observation, “I don’t know what we have exactly,
but I figured we’d detain them,” State’s Exhibit 1, 2:39-2:42, the State also attempts
to justify these aggressive measures based on the seriousness of the suspected crime:
“Corporal Reimers consistently maintained that he suspected that ‘there’s a potential
robbery going on or something of a similar nature.’” (Respondent’s brief, p. 20).
However, the facts known by the officers at the time of Mr. Maahs’s apprehension did
not support any suspicion of a robbery in progress.
While Corporal Reimers claimed that the large cash deposit made by the men
caused him to suspect a robbery, he conceded such a transaction would not be
suspicious for a credit union in the course of business. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 108, L. 11—p.
109, L. 3).

Corporal Reimers did not even know how much had actually been

deposited. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 108, Ls. 11-17). Although the district court concluded in its
opinion that this large deposit supported this suspicion that Mr. Maahs and Mr.
Korona might be engaged in a robbery, (R., p. 237), in its order granting the
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suppression motion filed by Kendall Wellard, the man detained in the credit union
parking lot, the district court found the opposite: “The making of a large deposit at a
credit union and changing clothes is pretty thin for reasonable suspicion of any
crime.” Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress at p. 6, State v. Wellard, CR0118-19966. 3
Furthermore, while the State emphasizes the officers’ lengthy experience when
it supports its arguments, it wholly ignores the fact that in their decades of
experience, neither officer had ever encountered a situation where a robber deposited
a large amount of money as a prelude to robbing a bank. (6/3/19, Tr., p. 109, L. 20—
p. 110, L. 7 (Corporal Reimers), 6/3/19 Tr., p. 164, Ls. 3-23 (Officer Mathis)). Officer
Mathis even candidly admitted that learning a possible robber initially made a large
cash deposit might well diminish his suspicion that a robbery was afoot. (6/3/19 Tr.,
p. 164, L. 25—p 165, L. 14). This knowledge about the large deposit thus should have
dispelled the officers’ suspicion of a potential robbery.
Perhaps recognizing this, Corporal Reimers testified that he began to suspect
the possible commission of a drug crime based on the large deposit and the men going
into the bathroom, which is a “great place to destroy drugs because you can flush
them, and they are now gone.” (6/3/19 Tr., p. 94, L. 22—p. 95, L. 1). Corporal Reimers
testified about his training and focus on drug law enforcement during his law
enforcement career to support this suspicion. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 84, L. 8—p. 85, L. 3).

On November 3, 2020, the Court granted Mr. Maahs’s Motion for Judicial Notice
or to Augment Clerk’s Record and indicated it would take judicial notice of the
Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress, in State v. Wellard, CR01-18-19966.

3
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However, many drug offenses, especially simple possession of a controlled
substance, do not involve the use of force or weapons; therefore, the suspicion of such
an offense does not support the officers’ use of extremely intrusive methods to seize
Mr. Maahs. In United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th
Cir.1988), law enforcement’s apprehension of drug traffickers at gunpoint and the
use of handcuffs to restrain them resulted in a de facto arrest.
The State attempts to distinguish Delgadillo-Velasquez, by claiming that the
Ninth Circuit “relied primarily on the fact that ‘the agents immediately told the men
that they were under arrest’” in concluding that the encounter constituted a de facto
arrest. (Respondent’s brief, p. 21 (quoting, Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d at 129596)). However, the State misreads Delgado-Velasquez, as the Ninth Circuit did not
identify this fact as the primary basis for its conclusion. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856
F.2d at 1295-96. To the contrary, in United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 825 (9th
Cir. 1990), which the State does not address, the Ninth Circuit specifically observed
that “[a]lthough in the instant case the police did not announce to the suspect that he
was under arrest, as they did in Delgadillo-Velasquez, the distinction is not pivotal.
Even without a statement that he was under arrest, the absolute curtailment of Del
Vizo's liberty clearly would have lead a reasonable person to believe that he was not
free to leave.” (emphasis added).
Thus, Officer Mathis’s repeated insistence that Mr. Maahs was only being
detained for investigation does not meaningfully distinguish Delgadillo-Velasquez,
given the similar absolute curtailment of Mr. Maahs’s liberty.
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Both Delgadillo-

Velasquez and Del Vizo show that drug trafficking offenses are not so inherently
dangerous to justify the use of extreme measures such as handcuffs and the pointing
of firearms during an investigatory detention. Rather, a stop premised on suspicion
of drug trafficking “will not support a per se justification for the use of guns and
handcuffs in a Terry stop.” United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053
(10th Cir. 1994).
The State tries to justify the officers’ intrusive tactics in seizing Mr. Maahs
based on several other facts that, when examined, fail to demonstrate that Mr. Maahs
and Mr. Korona presented a safety risk. For example, the State seems to suggest
that Officer Reimers’s initial confusion at finding the interior doors of the credit union
locked raised his concern about the danger presented by the two men: “Upon entering
the credit union, [Corporal Reimers] was puzzled by the locked doors, which indicated
to him that the bank employees were either attempting to “detain someone inside or
prevent others from getting inside.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 25).
However, Corporal Reimers’s insinuation that the locked doors raised his
concern is disingenuous in light of his bodycam footage. At the outset of that video
evidence, he can be seen talking to the credit union employee, who lets him inside.
(State’s Exhibit 1, 00:01-00:31). The employee does not exhibit any sense of urgency
or distress. Surely one would expect Corporal Reimers to ask the employee about the
locked doors if he had any lingering concern they might have signaled something
untoward.
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What is more, after that credit union employee walks off, Corporal Reimers
proceeds to the teller window area, where he has a brief exchange with other
employees.

They likewise do not appear to be anxious or scared, and Corporal

Reimers does not ask them about the locked doors that the State suggests caused him
concern. (State’s Exhibit 1, 00:32-00:51). The bodycam footage in State’s Exhibit 1
thus dispels any basis Corporal Reimers might have had to believe the initially locked
doors signaled some type of mischief by Mr. Maahs or Korona.
Similarly, the officers’ use of extreme measures to seize Mr. Maahs cannot be
justified based on some perceived danger to the civilian employees who were still
inside. (Respondent’s Brief, p. 16, 18; R., p. 238). The State fails to account for the
fact, as shown in Corporal Reimers’s bodycam footage, that he had the time and ample
opportunity to have those employees leave the building if his years of experience
caused him to believe Mr. Maahs and Mr. Korona presented a danger to their safety.
D.

Other Factors in the Totality of the Circumstances Support
the Conclusion That the Officers’ Actions Constituted a
De Facto Arrest

In addition to the highly intrusive methods used to apprehend and restrain
Mr. Maahs, several other factors defeat the State’s contention that this encounter
remained only an investigative detention and instead compel the conclusion that the
officers’ actions escalated it into a de facto arrest. These factors, along with the others
would cause a reasonable, innocent person to conclude that he was only being briefly
detained.
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Officer Mathis’s brusque tone and harsh physical treatment of Mr. Maahs
objectively belied his insistence that Mr. Maahs was only the subject of a brief
investigatory detention. He pulls his gun and aims it at Mr. Maahs, barking at him
in a stern voice to “get on the ground” and “put your hands right there,” followed by
his loud command, “Don’t move!” (State’s Exhibit 2, 00:31-00:35). Although Mr.
Maahs does not resist, Officer Mathis shoves his head down and roughly handles Mr.
Maahs as he handcuffs his hands behind his back. (State’s Exhibit 2, 00:45-1:00).
Officer Mathis continues to manhandle Mr. Maahs despite Mr. Maahs’s
compliance and his restraint in handcuffs. Officer Mathis’s bodycam shows him
pulling Mr. Maahs to his feet, while using both hands to continue to control him.
(State’s Exhibit 2, 1:01-1:18).

As this occurs, Mr. Maahs does not resist; he is

cooperative, and polite. Id.
Contrary to the State’s claim that Officer Mathis merely conducts a limited
pat-down frisk, the bodycam shows Officer Mathis proceeding to jam his hands inside
Mr. Maahs’s pockets and begin emptying the contents, which he puts on the water
fountain.

(State’s Exhibit 2, 1:19-1:39).

He maintains control of Mr. Maahs

throughout this time, and Mr. Maahs continues to offer no resistance. Id.
Officer Mathis’s tone as he questions Mr. Maahs is aggressive. When Mr.
Maahs asks him why he is being arrested, Officer Mathis becomes increasingly
agitated, advising Mr. Maahs that he is only being detained for investigation and that
he has already told him that twice. (State’s Exhibit 1:53-2:25). Officer Mathis
continuously keeps his hand on Mr. Maahs, making him stand with his face to the
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door and telling him to “stay right there.” Id..
- Officer Mathis does not respond to Mr.
Maahs’s questions about why he is being held, other than to interrupt him and repeat
that he is being detained for an investigation. Officer Mathis then removes Mr.
Maahs’s hat. (State’s Exhibit 2; 2:15-2:33). After Mr. Maahs calmly states that he
does not understand why he is being “harassed” and indicates he does not want to
talk with the officer because of the treatment he has received and the fact that it is
“scary,” Officer Mathis says, “Good, let’s go outside” and begins marching Mr. Maahs
through the credit union, keeping a constant grip on his arm. (State’s Exhibit 2, 2:503:30).
When Mr. Maahs asks where he is being taken, Officer Mathis responds in an
exasperated tone, “You’re going outside, that’s what I just told you.” (State’s Exhibit
2, 2:53-3:31). Officer Mathis then tells Mr. Maahs again that he is being detained for
an investigation based on the report that “there is some suspicious activity going on”
and the credit union employees called the police because he and Mr. Korona were
“acting a little strange” and “doing some weird things.” (State’s Exhibit 2, 3:32-3:50).
Officer Mathis then puts Mr. Maahs in the backseat of the patrol vehicle while
his hands are still cuffed behind his back, and as Mr. Maahs struggles to fit in the
cramped space. When Mr. Maahs asks again if he is under arrest, Officer Mathis
becomes agitated and yells at him. He then shuts the patrol vehicle door, cutting Mr.
Maahs off while he is talking and locking him in the backseat. (State’s Exhibit 2,
3:49-4:20). Later, Officer Mathis returns and contacts Mr. Maahs while he is in the
backseat, instructing him in a raised voice that he is not listening and that he needs
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to do what the police tell him without asking three times. (State’s Exhibit 2, 6:026:37). Again, Mr. Maahs’s tone is quiet and polite. At 10:30-10:35 on State’s Exhibit
2, Officer Mathis responds, “Nope,” when Mr. Maahs asks for water, telling him to
take a seat and “you’re fine.” Mr. Maahs continues to be confined in the backseat of
the patrol vehicle.
Officer Mathis’s demeanor and physical handling of Mr. Maahs further counter
the State’s position the manner of Mr. Maahs’s detention was reasonable.
(Respondent’s brief, p. 17).

These circumstances

would have conveyed to a

reasonable person that this was more than just a brief investigation following which
he would be free to leave. Officer Mathis’s bellicose tone and continuous physical
control of Mr. Maahs, followed by him requiring Mr. Maahs to squeeze into the
backseat of the patrol vehicle, and then curtly refusing to give him water further
establish this was a de facto arrest. Cf. United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 975
(1st Cir. 1994) (demeanor and deportment of investigating officers and polite tenor of
their remarks weighed against finding a de facto arrest).
The State argues that Mr. Maahs’s prolonged seizure in the back of the patrol
vehicle after he was apprehended with these forcible measures was reasonable.
(Respondent’s brief, p. 16). However, as addressed in the opening brief and reflected
by the bodycam footage, Mr. Maahs was held in the patrol vehicle for considerable
time after being removed from the scene of his apprehension inside the credit union.
(Appellant’s opening brief, p. 35).
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The State has the burden “to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify
on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration
to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.” State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420,
423, 901 P.2d 1321 1324 (1995). Considering the preceding totality of circumstances
involved in his seizure, Officer Mathis’s movement of Mr. Maahs from the scene and
the length of his detention further supports the conclusion that the officers exceeded
the bounds of an investigatory detention.
E.

The State Improperly Relies on Subjective Hunches
Instead of Sufficient Articulable Facts Establishing
Reasonable Suspicion

The State argues that Mr. Maahs was not seized immediately once he emerged
from the credit union bathroom because he did not yield to Officer Mathis’s verbal
command to come over to him. (Respondent’s brief, p. 15). As reflected above, the
finding that his backpedaling reflected his attempt to flee was clearly erroneous.
Corporal Reimers’s bodycam clearly shows that Mr. Maahs’s flight was provoked by
Officer Mathis’s sudden and swift advance, rather than in response to first viewing
the rear hallway door and then consciously moving towards it. (State’s Exhibit 1,
3:18-3:20). Furthermore, even if the Court credits the district court’s factual finding,
this Court must still determine its significance in the reasonable suspicion analysis.
The State also maintains that the tellers’ nervousness, which was based solely
on their vague indications that the men had made a large deposit and changed clothes
in the parking lot, (8/27/18 Tr., p. 35, L. 6—p. 36, L. 2; 6/3/19 Tr., p. 108, L. 7-10),
should be accorded “particular importance” and “weight” in establishing reasonable
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suspicion that Mr. Maahs was engaged in criminal activity. (Respondent’s brief, p.
25). The State’s position rejects the bedrock principle established decades ago in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), that subjective hunches unsupported with specific
articulable facts do not constitute reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See State
v. Bonner, ___ Idaho ___, 467 P.3d 452, 458 (2020) (quoting Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1,
27 (1967)). Instead, the State affords the tellers’ inchoate suspicions special probative
value due to their training and experience. (Respondent’s brief, p. 25).
The State unsurprisingly offers no authority from any court supporting its
novel claim that while the subjective hunches of law enforcement officers do not
establish reasonable suspicion, the gut instincts of credit union tellers can. The State
offers no explanation for this, when police officers generally possess at least as much,
if not more, training and experience in spotting suspicious activity.
Importantly, the district court contradicts itself regarding the significance of
the tellers’ nervousness in its inconsistent opinions resolving the motions to suppress
filed by Mr. Maahs and Kendall Wellard.

In its opinion granting Wellard’s

suppression motion, the district court did not attribute the tellers’ concerns any
weight; rather, it evaluated the articulable facts on which the tellers’ nervousness
was based, concluding they did not support the officers’ reasonable suspicion: “The
making of a large deposit at a credit union and changing clothes is pretty thin for
reasonable suspicion of any crime.” Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress at 6,
State v. Wellard, CR01-18-19966.
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However, in its order denying Mr. Maahs’s motion to suppress, the district
court reached precisely the opposite conclusion, finding the tellers’ nervousness, and
the facts forming the basis for it, supported Corporal Reimers’ reasonable suspicion:
“Cpl. Reimers gave justifiable weight to [the tellers’] concerns that the circumstances
they described in the call represented a potential risk of a robbery because of the
three men conferring with each other and one of them changing clothes in the parking
lot and the large deposit.” (R., p. 237) (emphasis added). 4
Furthermore, in the opinion granting Wellard’s motion, the district court made
findings recognizing the ambiguity in the initial report from the tellers: “There was
never any confirmation prior to his arrest that [Wellard] was the individual who made
the large deposit or changed clothes nor even was there any amplification of what
‘changing clothes’ meant to the teller (putting on a different tee shirt? A baseball
cap?).’” At the time the officers apprehended Mr. Maahs, those questions likewise
remained unanswered. (6/3/19 Tr., p. 118, Ls. 22-25, p. 121, L.8—p. 122, L. 16)
(Corporal Reimers’s testimony that he did not know which of the three men made the
large deposit or if there had been one or two deposits).
The State insists that despite the officers’ repeated “general expressions of
their concerns that something was amiss,” their reasonable suspicion of Mr. Maahs’s
criminal activity was grounded in “objective facts and circumstances.” (Respondent’s

At the May 9, 2018, preliminary hearing involving Mr. Maahs and Wellard, similar
testimony about the special training that tellers have in “recognizing suspicious
activity” was presented. (R., p. 148, p. 11, Ls. 2-4 (transcript of preliminary hearing,
attached as Exhibit A to Mr. Maahs’s motion to suppress)).
4
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brief, p. 28). Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), law enforcement
officers cannot stop individuals for behavior that is purely ambiguous; rather, under
the United States Constitution, they “’must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant” such an intrusion. State v. Bonner, ___ Idaho ___, 467 P3d 452, 462 (2020)
(quoting, Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868). “[The] demand for specificity in the
information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
In this case, the State has failed to meet its burden to show that the officers
had specific, articulable facts supporting an objective reasonable suspicion that Mr.
Maahs and Korona were engaged in criminal activity, as opposed to having only an
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.

Their lack of such objective

grounds for such a conclusion is reflected in the amorphous words and phrases used
by the officers to describe the situation, including: “hinky,” (6/3/19 Tr, p. 123, Ls. 16), “I don’t know what we have exactly,” (6/3/19 Tr., p. 123, L. 24—p. 124, L. 2), “I
suspected suspicious activity,” (6/3/19 Tr., p. 169, Ls. 3-6), “They could be, or they
couldn’t be [engaged in criminal activity],” (6/3/19 Tr., p. 163, Ls. 19-22), “There is
some suspicious activity going on,” and the police were called because Mr. Maahs and
Mr. Korona were “acting a little strange” and “doing some weird things.” (State’s
Exhibit 2, 3:32-3:50). These vague descriptions, the officers’ lack of clarity regarding
the particular crimes suspected, their reliance on the tellers’ unspecified nervousness,
as well as the district court’s unspecific observations that the officers were
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“confronting a suspicious but uncertain situation,” (R., p. 233), involving “concern
about the suspiciousness of the circumstances,” (R., p. 239), and an “unknown level
of risk,” (R., p. 238), and of “unknown” scope, (R., p., 234), presenting a “threatening”
situation (R., p. 227) – all powerfully reveal the officers’ lack of a particularized and
objective basis to believe that the defendants had engaged in criminal conduct. See
United States v. Jones, 438 F.Supp.3d 1039, 1057 (N.D.Cal. 2020) (statements made
by officers that there was something “a little weird” going on and that they were
trying to “figure out what’s going on” provided “compelling evidence” that they did
not have a particularized and objective basis to believe the defendants had engaged
in criminal conduct).
Conclusion
The State has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating specific articulable
facts supporting the officers’ objective reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Thus,
the officers lacked grounds to conduct even a limited investigative detention. Even if
they had, by employing the most intrusive measures to apprehend and restrain Mr.
Maahs, the officers exceeded the bounds of an investigative detention and
transformed this encounter into a de facto arrest unsupported by probable cause.
Because the officers’ actions violated Mr. Maahs’s Fourth Amendment rights under
the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, the
district court should have granted Mr. Maahs’s motion to suppress all evidence that
flowed from his unlawful seizure.

-31-

Accordingly, Mr. Maahs respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress and remand this case back to the district court
to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea and with instructions to the district court to
grant the motion to suppress and conduct further proceedings consistent with such
ruling.
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